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ABSTRACT
Ukraine is a country heavily dependent on other countries for its natural
gas supply, leaving it vulnerable to interruptions in supply. One of its largest
suppliers, Russia, has twice taken drastic means of physically closing the
pipelines, thereby cutting off this supply and illustrating to Ukraine and the world
the leverage that it can exercise. While at the present time the cut-offs have lasted
no longer than a few weeks, future cut-offs could become more common and
longer in duration. When compounded with the troubled history between the two
countries, one can quickly see the precipitous situation that has the potential to
escalate into armed conflict.
The methodology used in this thesis sought to identify a renewable energy
technology that could help reduce this dependency on foreign energy. The
technology must be feasible considering the climate, viable considering the cost,
and efficient in the production of an alternative fuel source. Biogas plants
(anaerobic digestion) were identified as satisfying all three of these conditions.
These plants can use as an input any biodegradable material, but corn silage was
quickly identified as the optimal input due to its low cost and high biogas yield.
Rural farmers were then identified as the optimal target population for these
digesters, due to their ownership of a large amount of land and having the existing
infrastructure in place to produce corn silage. The annual natural gas demand of
the rural farmers was found to be 4,200 cubic meters, which was used in the
calculation of the size of the actual digester that would produce this exact amount
of gas annually. The size of the digester was determined to be 9 cubic meters.
A financial analysis of the biogas plants then proved that this technology
produced a large amount of natural gas equivalent, and also provided financial
profits to those who constructed them. However, a problem soon arose. How
could rural farmers be expected to afford the lump sum payment necessary for the
construction of the digester?
A microfinance institution was then theorized that would provide the
upfront capital to construct these plants, who would then lease these plants to
rural farmers. These rural farmers would repay the lease over a five year term and
would benefit from the opportunity cost from synthesizing their own fuel. A
financial analysis of the borrower and the institution determined that both parties
would benefit financially from the institution, with borrowers experiencing profits
in year 1 and the institution achieving self-sufficiency in year 7.
The final section reports the impacts and final results that this institution
could potentially have on the country of Ukraine. First, it evaluates the amount of
carbon dioxide offsets generated by these digesters. Second, it values these
carbon offsets by using the market price of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) to
identify a potential funding opportunity for the institution. Finally, it measures
the total amount of natural gas that all digesters in operation would generate and
its impact on Ukraine’s importation of natural gas from foreign countries.
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ADVICE TO FUTURE HONORS STUDENTS
If you’re reading this, it probably means you’re being forced to, which
means you’re probably already following my first piece of advice which is to
register for the Capstone seminar class in your junior year! If I hadn’t been
forced to come to terms with the fact that I had to complete this project, I
probably would have procrastinated and my senior year would not have been
nearly as enjoyable as it has been.
That’s an important point: balance your time! Set aside large blocks of
time (at least three hours in my opinion) to work on your Capstone weekday
evenings and weekend afternoons, but don’t let the stress of your research
affect the rest of your senior year! Try to disconnect yourself from your
project when you’re not working on it and “plug yourself” back in when you
sit back down to do more research.
Make sure to file your “change of address” form to 306 Bowne Hall
because if you’re anything like me and you have terrible wireless internet at
your house, you’ll be spending a lot of time there. In fact, Joe Ralbovsky and
I kept track of how many hours we spent there, how many drinks consumed,
and how many bags of popcorn consumed there in the spring semester of 2011
by tucking a sign-up sheet behind the utility box. See if you can beat my
record of 46 hours over the course of the semester. If you have, please find
me wherever I am (I imagine in the future all people will be tracked 24/7 by
mobile GPS devices) so I can congratulate you on your academic prowess.
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1. Introduction

“A dispute between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas turned nasty
on Tuesday, as gas deliveries to a swath of European countries were cut off
entirely amid freezing winter temperatures. The escalating fight, which began
last week as a commercial disagreement over pricing, evoked a similar cutoff
three years ago and reignited debate across the European Union over its deep
reliance on Russian energy.”
“The two state gas companies blamed each other for halting supplies.
Russian analysts claimed that a looming presidential election in Ukraine lay at
the root of the dispute, while energy analysts elsewhere cited pipeline politics
and a breakdown in the basic transit contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz
as likely causes” (Osborn, Chazan, and Miller, 2009).
Ukraine’s strategic location, sharing its eastern border with Russia, has
led President Viktor Yanukovych to declare the country the “bridge between
the East and the West” (Yanukovych, 2010). BBC News reported that
perhaps Ukraine’s most important, and most volatile, asset is the fact that
nearly 80% of all natural gas supplies that originate in Russia must physically
pass through Ukraine in pipelines on their way to consumption in western
Europe (“EU Reaches,” 2009). Yet these pipelines present both opportunities
and vulnerabilities. While Ukraine is able to charge a transport tariff to
Russia that generates significant revenue, Russia has an almost unparalleled
bargaining chip: agree to our demands or we’ll cut off the gas supply to your
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country. To complicate matters further, past instances of high-level
corruption and missed payments on the part of Ukraine has left Russia
skeptical and distrustful of Ukraine’s actions. In response, Russia has twice
made good on its promise to completely shut off this supply to Ukraine.
As a result, it is imperative that Ukraine begin focusing its efforts on
alternative sources of energy. Many inside and outside of Ukraine are
exploring the concept of using various forms of renewable energy to achieve
that goal. This paper will analyze the potential of using small-scale renewable
energy projects that will be feasible and complement the country’s geography
and current structures. While there are numerous technologies currently being
implemented around the world, this thesis will primarily focus on the potential
for small-scale anaerobic digesters that would generate biogas, which is a
natural gas substitute and could be used in the same heaters that Ukrainians
now use. Similar small-scale biogas projects have already been implemented
in Nepal, Moldova, and in countries throughout Africa, just to name a few.
The environmental impacts of reducing greenhouse gases may be
obvious to the reader, but the financial impacts may not be as apparent. The
production of biogas on-site from a digester would allow the owner to reduce
significantly the cost of their fuel supply and become independent from
others’ unpredictable actions.
The construction costs of these digesters are too high to reasonably
expect people to be able to afford with a down payment. However, in many
cases it is also impossible for these same people to borrow any amount of
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money from traditional banks, due to little or non-existent credit and lack of
collateral. This is where the role of microfinance can come into play as a
potential solution.
Microfinance is the provisioning of credit to individuals that are not
typically extended credit through traditional financial instruments. While
there are numerous sources of funds in order to provide this credit, this thesis
will seek to explore the “Kiva approach” which for the purposes of this paper
will include a web-based portal that allows forward-thinking,
environmentally-minded individuals that recognize the myriad opportunities
these funds would provide to lend their money for a period of time.
In summary, this thesis seeks to answer the question, “What if it was
possible to construct a project that would not only help to address Ukraine’s
energy dependency, but have reverberating geopolitical, environmental, and
potentially financial impacts for decades to come? And if this was possible,
how could it be funded in a country who, because of lack of resources, has
updated very little of its existing energy technology?”
In order to answer this question, this paper will first provide
background information regarding the history and geopolitical structure of
Ukraine, new renewable technologies that could potentially help to replace
natural gas, and the emerging international development tool known as
microfinance. In section 5, the paper will then apply the historical research to
the current situation by evaluating first the financial feasibility of anaerobic
digestion, considering the geographic restraints of the region in which they
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will be constructed. Section 6 will analyze the opportunity for a microfinance
institution to be created to help provide capital for the construction of these
digesters, evaluating from both the borrower’s (where the digesters are built)
and the lender’s (the institution’s) perspective. Finally, section 7 will use the
forecasts of growth from section 6 to illustrate the results and impacts this
institution could have in the region and in the world.

2. The History of Ukraine: Leading up to the Crisis

2a. The Forging of Ukraine and Russia's Relationship

The complicated story between Russia and Ukraine begins nearly
1,200 years ago with the establishment of the Kievan Rus' state, a oncepowerful medieval state that was invaded by the Mongol people and
disintegrated in 1240 (“Kievan Rus,” 2007). After this disintegration, Russia
succeeded in uniting the northern Rus' provinces, including the territories of
modern-day Russia and Ukraine that would serve as the foundation for a long
and interconnected relationship for centuries to come.
For hundreds of years Ukraine remained a conquered territory, being
occupied as a whole by Lithuania and Poland until partitioning by Poland split
the country in half. While the Western portion of Ukraine was taken over by
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Eastern portion was incorporated into the
Russian Empire. It is important to note this early division in territory, as we
4

will see later the effects that this division continues to have on Ukrainian
society.
With the Bolshevik Revolution putting an end to the Russian Empire
in 1917, one of Ukraine's occupants was defeated and Ukraine declared its
independence on January 22nd, 1918 for the first time in its history ("Brief
Ukraine History," 2011). Although independent, Poland's continued
occupation of western Ukraine meant that Ukraine would not be unified.
According to the U.S. Department of State, the modern state of
Ukraine emerged in 1922, when the central and eastern regions were
incorporated into the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic was officially created (“Background Note,” 2010). Subjugated to
oppressive and socialist programs, "the Soviet government under Stalin
created an artificial famine (called 'Holodomor' in Ukrainian) as part of his
forced collectivization policies, which killed millions of previously
independent peasants and others throughout the country. Estimates of deaths
from the 1932-33 Holodomor alone range from 3 million to 7 million"
("Background Note," para. 11). In 1939, following the invasion of Poland by
Soviet and German troops, western Ukraine was annexed by the Soviet Union,
uniting modern Ukraine for the first time in its history and increasing its
territory by 50,600 square miles and increasing its population by over 7
million people (Subtelny, 1988). Now unified, Ukraine continued to lack
independence.
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Ukraine remained under this Soviet rule for nearly seventy years until
the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 set into motion a series of events
that finally saw Ukraine emerge as an independent, unified country in August
of 1991.
If we review the history of Ukraine, we see that only during two
periods (from 1918-1922 and from 1991 - present) has Ukraine experienced
independence. Yuri Borovsky, a Masters student at Syracuse University
studying public diplomacy who was born in Kyiv and has lived in Ukraine all
of his life, cites this singular fact as being a fundamental cause for the lack of
nationalism in Ukraine and the subsequent complex relationship with Russia,
a country who has shaped almost all aspects of Ukrainian life (Borovsky,
personal communication, November 18, 2010).
Obviously, Ukraine and Russia's long territorial history translates to a
plethora of linguistic, social, and cultural linkages that this paper will not
explore for brevity's sake. These linkages continue to this day, but some
Ukrainians look favorably towards these links as opportunities to play a
mediating role with the East and the West. For example, Ukraine’s current
president, Viktor Yanukovych once said that, “We are a nation with a
European identity, but we have historic cultural and economic ties to Russia
as well. We can benefit from both” (Yanukovych, 2010). This paper seeks to
explore one of the most valuable, and physical, links between the two
countries: the precious natural gas pipelines that flow from Russia through
Ukraine.

6

2b. Ukraine's Energy Dependency on Russia

Ukraine's current industrial production is a result of decades of
subsidization and inefficiency, as Ukraine was one of the primary industrial
producers of the Soviet Union. For example, in the post-war years of the
Soviet Union, the industrial productivity of Ukraine doubled over the pre-war
level (Magocsi, 1996). In addition, the rapid urbanization of Ukraine during
the 1950s and 1960s dramatically increased its demand for energy.
Before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine's arrangements
with Russia provided for cheap natural gas to flow through the pipelines and
subsidize the costs of this fuel. As a result, little effort was made to conserve
natural gas and the industrial processes that were established before 1991 did
not take into consideration the high inefficiency of the process (Evans, 1998).
Following Ukraine's independency and its subsequent transition to a market
economy, the country experienced a seven-year recession that saw its gross
domestic product (GDP) fall by 68%, industrial output fall by 52% and capital
investments fall by 74% (Pirani, 2007). This recession greatly affected the
ability of businesses and consumers to modernize their equipment. As a result,
much of the countries' domestic heating systems and industries are still
heavily reliant on Russian gas imports (Osborn, 2009, January 5).
Since becoming independent, Ukraine has lost almost all of the natural
gas subsidies it had previously enjoyed from Russia. Ukraine is a country that
has seen the cost of its natural gas rise from $50 USD per 1000 cubic meters
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(cm) as late as 2005 to $250 USD per 1000 cm in 2009, a 500% increase in
price over the course of only four years (Osborn, 2009, January 2). All
amounts in this thesis that are dollar-denominated have been converted into
U.S. dollars from the original currency at exchange rates current as of April
22nd, 2011.
While Ukraine's consumption of natural gas in 2010 has decreased
approximately 39% since an all-time high of 84.9 billion cubic meters (bcm)
consumed in 2008, much of this decrease is probably attributed to the global
recession's impact on a decrease in manufacturing and the country continues
to be the 14th highest consumer of natural gas in the world ("Natural Gas
Consumption," 2009).
Ukraine's demand for natural gas remains high, while its domestic
annual production of natural gas has remained stagnant at approximately 20
bcm ("Natural Gas Production," 2009). With such high consumption, Ukraine
does not export any of its natural gas, but must import the difference between
their domestic production and their consumption, which the International
Energy Agency estimates at around 45 bcm annually. Natural gas constitutes
nearly 65% of all energy imports for Ukraine ("2008 Energy Balance," 2008).
In addition to this, the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s
International Energy Annual Report (2005) found that nearly 69% of all
natural gas imports come from Russia directly. While the remaining natural
gas may originate in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Russia's state-owned gas
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monopoly Gazprom delivers this natural gas to Ukraine's border through a
pipeline system ("Ukraine: Economy," 2009).
Yet Russia is not the only player in this natural gas relationship due to
the geographical necessity for 80% of all Russian natural gas pipelines, on
their way to consumption in western Europe, to run through Ukrainian
territory. Ukraine officially owns these pipelines that are located within their
territory and charges a tariff to Russia for the ability to transport through these
pipelines. Russia has recognized their vulnerability and Ukraine's leverage in
this situation and has, accordingly, begun the construction of two major
pipelines named Nord Stream and South Stream that will be completed by
2015 and will circumvent all Ukrainian territory by being constructed
underneath the Baltic and the Black Seas, respectively (Nord Stream AG,
2007).
With this precarious relationship adding fodder to an already-fragile
region, it is easy to imagine this situation erupting into conflict, as it did in
2006 and 2009.

2c. The Well Runs Dry: The Gas Shut-Offs of 2006 and 2009

After a series of price and non-payment disputes arose between
Ukraine and Russia in the 1990s, the situation escalated in May 2005, when it
was discovered that approximately 7.8 bcm of natural gas that Gazprom had
deposited in Ukrainian storage units had not been made available to the
9

company. Gazprom quickly alleged that this natural gas had been stolen by
the Ukrainian authorities, but the issue was resolved by July 2005 ("Gazprom
and Naftogaz," 2005). However, price disputes and gas supply agreements
could not be settled by the end of 2005 and therefore on January 1, 2006,
Ukraine for the first time began to see the pressure in its pipelines begin to
drop.
The supply, however, was restored three days later on January 4, 2006,
in large part because of the logistics of the shut-off. Because 80% of all
Russian gas exports to western Europe must flow through Ukraine, Russia had
no way of cutting off the supply to Ukraine without interrupting important
trade relationships with western European consumers.
While Ukraine had agreed to gradual price rises during the various
resolutions and agreements that resulted, Gazprom argued that the rise in
world gas prices necessitated larger increases in price. By the end of 2008 a
price agreement had not been decided upon and the newspaper RIA Novosti
reported that another natural gas disruption resulted on January 1, 2009, as
Russia halted completely an export of 90 million cm per day to Ukraine
("Russia Fully Cuts," 2009). This interruption had the "domino effect" of
affecting the supply of many European Union countries, yet the dispute was
not settled after 20 days. On January 21, 2009, Reuters reported that Ukraine
agreed to pay Gazprom the world price for natural gas with a 20% discount in
2009 and the full world price in 2010 ("Russia and Ukraine," 2009).

10

In order to examine the impact that these shut-offs can have in
Ukraine, one must first explore the vulnerabilities of Ukraine when these
interruptions occur and where the priorities of the government lie when it has
a limited supply of natural gas.

2d. Domestic Impact of Interruptions in Supply

In order to hedge itself against such unpredictability in natural gas
supply, Ukraine has built up substantial amounts of reserve gas in
underground storage facilities (Woehrel, 2009). These reserves have been
projected to serve the country's demand for a few months. Until this point,
this reserve has been adequate as Russia has been unable to cut off the supply
for more than 20 days, yet with Nord and South Stream coming online in 2015,
Russia will be able to halt supplies to Ukraine without affecting supplies to
western Europe. As a result, future interruptions in supply could last longer
than Ukraine's available reserves.
Recent developments have impacted the necessary response of
Ukraine if a disruption in supply were to occur again. As a result of the
Ukrainian-Russian crisis, the European Union adopted a new Regulation in
September 2010 that mandates member-states to prepare an emergency plan
for household consumers in the case of a loss of natural gas supply. "The goal
of the Regulation is to make sure that every member-state would be in a
position to survive the loss of its main import source and continue to supply
11

its protected clients, namely household and basic social services, for at least a
period of 30 days" (Tsakiris, 2010, para. 4).
One important point of contention emerged around the breadth of the
"protected clients" definition. While Europe's gas industries wanted the
definition to include industrial customers and electricity producers, the
definition was only marginally expanded to include small and medium-sized
enterprises and essential social services, provided they are connected to a gas
distribution network. Also, district heating installations that are dependent
solely on natural gas for operation were included in the protected customers
(Tsakiris, 2010).
As a result, those consumers that would be immediately impacted by a
disruption in supply would be large industrial users and electricity suppliers.
While the International Energy Agency estimates that electricity suppliers use
less than 3% of natural gas as their fuel input, industrial users would be more
impacted due to the fact that over 30% of their fuel input is natural gas ("2008
Energy Balance," 2008).
In 2006, Ukraine became an observer to the European Union's Energy
Community Treaty, which establishes a framework for ensuring the stability
of energy networks and energy security (Energy Community, 2011). In July
2010, Ukraine began to align its gas market to European standards and the
formal accession process began in September 2010. The Ukrainian
Parliament adopted the law on Ukrainian accession in December 2010
(Vichos, 2010). With the accession process predicted to be completed by
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early 2011, Ukraine will have a much stronger framework for responding to
issues of energy security. As a member, it will be required to adopt the
Community's acquis communitaire, which includes the aforementioned
emergency plan regulation ("The Energy Community," 2010).

2e. The Geography and Agriculture of Ukraine

We have spoken at length about Ukraine’s strategic position relative to
other countries, but let us focus for a moment on the geographical, agricultural,
and cattle-raising in order to better understand the country as a whole.
In Figure 1, we can see that the total geographic area of Ukraine is
603,700 square kilometers, with a majority of its land mass consisting of
fertile plains (steppes) and plateaus. However, the Carpathian Mountains are
found in the westernmost part of the country and the Dnipro River, which
traverses the country from north to south, nearly divides the country in half.
As a result of this large proportion of steppes and plateaus, which are two
biomes conducive to agriculture, over 56% of Ukraine’s land mass is
considered arable land (“Ukraine,” 2011).
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Figure 1: Topographic Map of Ukraine

The climate in Ukraine is also conducive to agricultural production,
with most of the country having a temperate continental climate. Only the
southern Crimean coast has a Mediterranean climate that leads to warmer
temperatures. Precipitation is disproportionately distributed, with the most
being experienced in June and July in the west and north areas of the country
and the east and southeast receiving considerably less rainfall during these
months (“Ukraine,” 2011).
While under Soviet rule, Ukraine’s agricultural regions were
aggressively used to produce 20 percent of the grain needs and over 60
percent of the sugar beet needs of the entire Soviet Union, despite being one
of the smallest republics, constituting only 2.7% of the total land area of the
Union. Soviet influence has continued to this day, as Ukraine’s major
exported crops continue to be winter wheat, sugar beets, and potatoes.
There are three main agro-ecological zones of Ukraine (see Figure 2),
each producing crops most conducive to their soil type and temperate climate.
14

Polissya, located in the northern mixed forest zone and constituting 19% of
Ukraine’s land mass, is the least ploughed part of the territory. Conditions in
this zone are suited to many cereals, pulse crops, and potatoes, and traditional
development of beef-dairy cattle-raising. The Forest Steppe region, located in
the central portion of the country and constituting 33% of Ukraine’s land mass,
has a much higher percentage of ploughed land with approximately 82% of
the cultivated land within the zone prepared for agriculture. This zone’s main
commodity industries are its production of winter wheat and white beets,
although it is also suited for maize and peas. The moister northern and northwest portions also support perennial grasses. Finally, the southern-most
Steppe region is the largest region by acreage (making up 40% of the total
Ukraine land mass). Large areas of this region (1.2 million hectares) are
occupied by maize to be used for green fodder and silage. Its main crops
include winter wheat and sunflower and the zone also supports cattle and
sheep-rearing (Bogovin, 2006).
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Figure 2: Agro-Ecological Zones of Ukraine

Ukraine’s agricultural production has decreased significantly since the
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, due to the loss of state subsidies that farmers
once enjoyed under the previous system. Land reforms in 1992 freely
distributed this once state-owned land to private citizens to carry on private
farming. The number of farms in the country now totals 40,000, with the
average farm’s area being 22.6 hectares (ha) which is a unit of measurement
equal to 10,000 square meters. Individual ownership of farms has proven
though to be difficult to maintain profitability. As a result, the formation of
co-operatives, agrarian partnerships, and the leasing of land plots have all
attempted to strengthen farm ownership and create economies of scale.
The number of livestock has decreased in Ukraine from over 24
million heads of cattle in 1990 to 7 million heads of cattle in 2005. This
decrease was caused primarily because the majority of these cattle are raised
on small, private farms which only hold one or two cows. These small farms
16

do not have the capacity to store and treat any excess milk that these cows
may produce in order to sell on the open market, and therefore do not have
any incentive to raise more cows than needed for their own consumption.
Sheep-rearing has also found popularity in Ukraine, primarily in the Steppe
zone, where 60% of all sheep are found, although heads of sheep have also
decreased drastically from 8.4 million in 1990 to 1.9 million in 2006 (Bogovin,
2006).
Since 1991, there has been a major shift from the state agricultural
enterprises popularized during Soviet rule to more entrepreneurial singleowned farms. This private ownership is to be expected in a country like
Ukraine. When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, with the inflow of new
ideas and a new system of government came a resurgence of entrepreneurial
spirit that had been suppressed for decades. That spirit remains today, as is
evidenced by recent Eurobarometer data that has found that 50% of
Ukrainians want to start their own business, higher than the European Union
average of 45% (“Entrepreneurship,” 2009). Further statistics serve to
reinforce this belief, signaled by an exceptional growth in the number of
private farms, from 2,600 in 1991 to nearly 43,000 in 2010 and continues to
grow. In addition, the number of cultivated agricultural land has grown from
1 million ha in 1991 to 4.2 million ha of land in 2010 (“Agriculture News,”
2010).
Rural households also use substantially more natural gas for heating
than urban households, with annual gas consumption of 2.8 thousand cubic
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meters (tcm) compared to 1.5 tcm in urban settings (“Household Gas Prices,”
2006). For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that rural farmers
consume 1.5 times the average demand for rural households, due to the fact
that these farms have a number of secondary buildings that require heating for
their animal stock and other farm operations. Despite this high consumption
of fuel, the average rural farmer has an annual salary of only $3,000 (“Irish
Farming Links,” 2011).

2f. Long Lines and Shortages: A Time of Resourcefulness

Borovsky describes the Ukrainian people first and foremost as
“forward-thinking” and people who “make things last” (Borovsky, personal
communication, November 18, 2010). He attributes this mentality to a forced
scarcity that all Ukrainians lived under during Soviet rule, where bread lines
stretched for blocks and families waited months in order for their lottery
number to be called for an apartment. As a result, the Ukrainian culture has
been defined by this idea of resourcefulness and the country has emerged as a
particularly strong proponent of environmental measures when they can be
afforded. Although much of the industry sectors remain to use outdated
technology for production due to the cost of this technology and not lack of
interest, other sectors have begun shifting their business models to include the
impact their business will have on the environment. An encouraging example
is the media sector, where on March 11, 2011, Kyiv Weekly became the first
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eco-friendly newspaper and now uses recycled paper for all of their printed
materials (“Kyiv Weekly”).

2g. Summary

In conclusion, Ukraine has the most energy-intensive economy in the
world (Pirani, 2007). Inefficient consumption of cheap gas and an
overdependence on imported gas are an integral part of this problem and will
remain so until more energy-efficient measures are implemented. Russia
argues that it has provided "humanitarian aid" to Ukraine by subsidizing the
cost of its natural gas for nearly 20 years, and no longer has any obligation to
the now-independent country. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin defiantly
declared in December 2008 that the "age of cheap gas is over" (“Putin,” 2008).
Amidst all of the confusion, only one thing is certain: Ukraine must diversify
its energy inputs or continue to be at the whim of a foreign power. A
burgeoning agricultural sector provides opportunity for renewable
technologies to help achieve this diversification. However, there appears to
be a mismatch between the cost of this technology and the average annual
income of farmers, presenting an opportunity for innovation in the form of
microfinance.
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3. Microfinance

3a. Microfinance's Beginnings

The concept of microfinance is not a new idea. Traces of
microfinance can be found in the Irish Loan Fund system, established in the
early 1700s by author and nationalist Johnathan Swift. The Fund's purpose
was to make small loans with interest for short periods, though it did not
necessarily target the poor and at its peak was making loans to 20% of all Irish
households annually (“The History,” 2006).
Microfinance's focus on the poor was not realized until the emergence
of formal credit and savings institutions in the late 1800s in Europe. These
institutions were motivated by the concern to assist the rural population to
break out of their dependence on moneylenders and to improve their welfare.
This primary focus of microfinance institutions remains to this day.
In the broadest sense, modern microfinance refers to a movement that
envisions a world in which low-income households have permanent access to
a range of high quality financial services to finance their income-producing
activities, build assets, stabilize consumption, and protect against risks. The
traditional microfinance institution (MFI) makes small, short-term, lowinterest loans to an impoverished group of people, who are responsible for
repaying that loan. Unlike traditional banks, MFIs do not generally require
collateral from borrowers, but instead rely upon the social pressures of
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solidarity lending to enforce repayment. Borrowers who do not repay are, in
almost all cases, forbidden from borrowing again from an MFI.
Organizations like ACCION and the SEWA Bank (Self-Employed
Women's Association) were among the first to take up this mission and did so
by targeting the poorest of the poor in impoverished areas throughout Latin
America and Africa ("The History," 2006)
The traditional microfinance group loan methodology was first
popularized by the work of Muhammad Yunus during the founding of the
Grameen Bank, a microfinance institution that was the 2006 recipient of the
Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to create economic and social development
amongst the world's poor. Established in Bangladesh in 1983, the Grameen
Bank makes use of a lending practice known as solidarity lending.
In many third-world countries, laws related to secured transactions
(involving the use of collateral) may be absent or not enforced. In solidarity
lending, loans are not given out to individuals, but instead to groups of people,
using various types of social capital such as peer pressure and mutual support
to offset the need for collateral. Psychologists have found that groups of five
are the ideal size for these groups, as they are small enough to ensure joint
responsibility and discourage free-riders, but at the same time large enough to
prevent one person's misfortune from causing the group's collapse (Dowla &
Burua, 2006).
In order to pay the high administrative costs involved with
microfinancing (as these small loans generate an enormous amount of
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paperwork and often times require loan officers to travel to isolated areas to
service customers) interest rates are charged on these loans, sometimes in
excess of 20% (Fernando, 2006). Although these customers cannot be offered
traditional bank loans due to their lack of collateral (and their alternative, loan
sharks, can charge in excess of 300%), microfinance institutions have
sometimes been criticized for charging substantially high interest rates that
appear to contradict their mission. Microfinance institutions defend their
critics with the simple, but most widely misunderstood, fact that they are not
established as charitable institutions but instead as organizations offering the
poor opportunities that they would not otherwise have so that they may build
better lives for themselves and their families.

3b. Modern Microfinance Methodology

From microfinance's humble beginnings has emerged a complex
product that now offers a wide range of services, including specific
methodologies for housing, savings, insurance, and credit microfinance. For
the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the methodologies behind credit
microfinance that has itself expanded into various different types of loans.
ACCION, one of the premier organizations in the world committed to
building stronger MFIs, believes that, "credit methodology lies at the heart of
microfinance and its quality is one of the most determinant factors for the
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efficiency, impact and profitability of an MFI" ("Credit Methodology," para.
1).
Since 1973, ACCION has worked with MFIs to adjust methodological
innovations to the specific requirements of the institution. As such, a newly
formed institution must first consider a number of activities involved in
lending including sales, client selection, application and approval process,
repayment monitoring, and delinquency management.
ACCION believes that different lending practices, such as the
aforementioned solidarity lending of Grameen Bank and individual lending do
not necessarily have to be contradictory but instead can be complementary, as
long as they fit with the institution's overall business strategy ("Credit
Methodology," 2011).
The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh also uses its own model for its MFI
operations. First, it conducts surveys of geographical communities to brief the
potential for operations in the village, including an evaluation of the village
population and degree of poverty. After it has decided upon a suitable village
that has shown need and infrastructure required for microfinancing, Grameen
establishes a presence in that village. A "village center" is created, where the
borrowers can meet on a weekly basis and repay their loans, while also
discussing new loan applications and community issues ("Working Method,"
2011). Meanwhile, groups of borrowers undergo a 5-day training course in
this center where they are educated on financial products, interest rate
calculation, and entrepreneurial business skills.

23

3c. Where Does Microfinance Work?

Microfinance's beginnings in areas such as Bangladesh and South
America is not a coincidence. Microfinance functions most effectively in
third-world countries that have very low standards of living, as very small
amounts of money can create a real sense of financial viability for
impoverished people. In addition, laws and regulations in industrialized
countries tend to prevent MFIs from being as effective as they would
otherwise be in an unregulated economy. As a result, Bangladesh is tied with
India as being home to the most MFIs (7 each) listed in the top 50
microfinance institutions in the world (according to Forbes magazine).
Conversely, none of the top 50 microfinance institutions were established in
any country within the European Union or in the United States (Swibel, 2007).
This is not to say that MFIs cannot be established or function
effectively in industrialized countries. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke, an unlikely ally, spoke in November 2007 at the ACCION Texas
Summit on Microfinance about the similarities in goals and core values of
U.S.-based MFIs to those established in third-world countries. However,
Bernanke did acknowledge the obvious differences in the operational details
of U.S. programs in relation to overseas programs, also remarking that "to a
greater extent than overseas, microfinance programs here have expanded their
offerings to deliver education, training, and various other services to nascent
entrepreneurs" (Bernanke, 2007).
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3d. Case Study: USAID’s Nepal Biogas Microfinance Capacity Building
Program

The idea of using microfinancing to raise capital for small-scale
renewable energy projects has been successfully implemented in many areas
of the world, most notably in Africa, in Bangladesh through the Grameen
Shakti program, and in Nepal through an interesting humanitarian partnership.
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
United State federal agency primarily responsible for administering civilian
foreign aid, has recognized the opportunity afforded by microfinance, and as a
result has implemented the Nepal Biogas Microfinance Capacity Building
Program (“USAID History,” 2011). The UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs Division for Sustainable Development recognizes that this
program “works to ensure that biogas investments are eligible for microcredit
at affordable interest rates and to facilitate loans through rural based
microcredit lenders” (“Microcredit for Farmers,” para. 1).
USAID has advocated on behalf of microcredit lenders to the Nepalese
government to raise the limit for microcredit per household from $425 to $725.
In addition, USAID has provided a substantial amount of loans that have
leveraged subsequent investment; the program has been successful in not only
providing the capital but building the policy framework for this project to
become self-sufficient after an initial period of assistance (“Nepal
Microcredit,” 2011).
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To date, the program has achieved significant results. According to
USAID, over 600 biogas plants have been constructed using microcredit,
benefiting 3,000 people, and mitigating 2,700 tons of carbon dioxide.
USAID’s initial investment of $81,000 in MFI loans has leveraged over
$200,000 in total additional investments. The microfinance institutions in
Nepal distributing these loans have reported a near 100% repayment rate.

4.

Feasible Small-Scale Renewable Energy Projects

There are a number of renewable energy technologies currently
available and feasible that could be implemented in Ukraine in order to
achieve the desired outcome of this thesis. However, this section will
examine the unique advantages afforded by selecting anaerobic digestion as
the preferred alternative energy source.

4a. Anaerobic Digestion: The Process

The US Department of Energy defines anaerobic digestion as the
process by which microorganisms break down biodegradable materials, in the
absence of oxygen, into several products that can eventually be used for the
production of electricity or heat, as well as fertilizer (“How Anaerobic
Digestion,” 2011). The process begins with bacterial hydrolysis, at which
time insoluble organic polymers, such as carbohydrates, are broken down to
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be used by other bacteria. Acidogenic bacteria then convert these products
(sugars and amino acids) into carbon dioxide, ammonia, hydrogen, and
organic acids. Acetogenic bacteria then convert these organic acids into acetic
acid and additional carbon dioxide, ammonia, and hydrogen. Finally,
methanogens convert these products to methane and carbon dioxide. See
Figure 3 for an illustration of this process.
Digesters can be categorized as either wet or dry systems that are “fed”
with inputs either continuously or loaded in batches. In a batch-fed digester,
waste is fed into the inlet of the plant and the digester is sealed, allowing the
microorganisms to process the waste and biogas to be produced. The amount
of time that the waste must remain in the digester to allow for anaerobic
digestion to completely occur, also known as its retention rate, varies based on
the input type. The time required to complete the anaerobic digestion process
can vary from ten days (if batch feeding with mostly solids) to eight weeks (if
continuously feeding with mostly liquids) (Fowler, 2011).

Figure 3: The Three Stages of Anaerobic Digestion
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Anaerobic digestion has become a widely-used renewable energy
source not only because of the availability of its inputs (food waste, animal
manure, etc.) but also because of the versatility and usability of its products,
including a rich biogas that can be used as a natural gas substitute and a
nutrient-rich digestate that can be used as fertilizer. The methane that is
produced from this process can be burned to produce both heat and electricity.
In order to generate the latter, the biogas must be used as a fuel in a
reciprocating engine or microturbine, a market that General Electric has
explored extensively in areas of Eastern Europe (“GE Energy,” 2011). Any
material that cannot be digested by the microbes constitutes the digestate that
can be used as a fertilizer to improve soil conditions. The technology as a
whole has seen an enormous amount of growth within the last decade. While
world anaerobic digestion growth data is unavailable, the Environmental
Protection Agency estimates that energy production in the United States by
anaerobic digestion has grown from approximately 15 million kilowatt
hours/year (kWh/year) equivalent in 2000 to nearly 375 million kWh/year
equivalent in 2009 (“Anaerobic Digesters Continue,” 2010).
Anaerobic digestion in particular benefits from its potential for
scalability, ability to be implemented almost anywhere in the world, and
feasibility at almost any size of digester. Countries such as China have been
successfully installing small-scale anaerobic digesters for nearly 40 years
(“Anaerobic Digester,” 2011). For the remainder of this paper only smallscale anaerobic digesters will be considered.
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4b. The Environmental Benefits of Anaerobic Digestion

A majority of the environmental benefits of anaerobic digesters
originate from the fact that this biogas serves as a replacement fuel to coalbased and natural gas resources that generate a significant amount of
greenhouse gases when produced and when burned.
Biogas is unique when one takes into consideration the carbon cycle,
which, simply put, is the idea that carbon is present in every living thing and
when that organism dies the carbon is then released into the atmosphere in the
form of carbon dioxide. Photosynthetic plants then absorb that carbon dioxide
in order to grow. When these plants die, the carbon is then released back into
the atmosphere and the cycle begins again.
Because biogas is synthesized from the carbon that is present in
biodegradable materials, when the biogas is burned it is simply returning to
the atmosphere the same carbon that was taken out in the recent past by the
plants that used it to grow. When the second byproduct of anaerobic digestion,
the nutrient-rich digestate, is used as a fertilizer to create more plants that will
remove more carbon from the atmosphere, the system as a whole becomes
carbon neutral. This process stands in stark contrast to the carbon released
from fossil fuel-burning, which has been sequestered in the earth for millions
of years, the combustion of which increases the overall levels of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere (“Benefits,” 2011).

29

In addition, anaerobic digestion processes biodegradable materials that
would otherwise take up space in a landfill and reduces the amount of
methane (a greenhouse gas 20 times more powerful than carbon dioxide) that
would be naturally released into the atmosphere during the natural decay of
that item.
Finally, in countries that collect household waste, the process of waste
in an on-site digester reduces the amount of transportation that that waste
would otherwise require to be brought to an incinerator, reducing the
greenhouse gases associated with vehicle emissions (“Framework,” 2011).

4c. Small-Scale Uses

Besides the availability of their inputs and the value of their outputs,
anaerobic digestion projects are especially attractive for small-scale
implementation because of the small amount of capital required to start up a
plant and the low impact they have on the surrounding environment that might
otherwise stir up public opposition. In fact, “anaerobic digestion facilities
have been recognized by the United Nations Development Programme as one
of the most useful decentralized sources of energy supply” (Ho, para. 1).
Decentralization in this instance implies that energy generation is not limited
to one localized area and then distributed elsewhere, but instead that energy is
generated in numerous locations throughout a particular geographic area.
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On a household level, the production of biogas also allows for the
controlled management of animal dung and the safe production of gas for
cooking, lighting, or power generation. Although these small-scale projects
have experienced the most widespread usage China, where it currently holds
the lead with 15 million households using such technology, these projects
have been implemented on every continent in the world, except for Antarctica
(Van Nes, 2006).

4d. Case Study: Moldova Biomass Heating in Rural Communities Project

The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change
(UNFCCC), better known to most of the world by its principal update, the
Kyoto Protocol, has been the primary international document that has
encouraged the growth of renewable energy projects worldwide since it was
established in 1992 (“Article 2,” 1992). Designed in cooperation with the
Kyoto mechanisms, the Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF) was
created as a public/private initiative in 2003 to provide carbon finance to the
poorer nations of the world.
The Moldova Biomass Project was created in 2005 as a result of this
framework, which helped to establish funds and an international forum for
discussing such innovative renewable energy projects. The focus of this
project in particular is the installation of individual biogas plants to help
provide electricity and heat to 120 public buildings throughout the country.
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The project’s approach takes advantage of the beneficial decentralized energy
supply of anaerobic digestion, with each project being at least 1 kilometer
apart and at most 400 kilometers apart.
In order to implement the project within the country, a new Carbon
Finance Unit (CFU) was created under the Ministry of Ecology and Natural
Resources. The CFU is an independent legal entity that serves as a
counterpart to the CDCF, and is responsible for negotiating on behalf of each
individual project the Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA),
which documents the amount of greenhouse gas emissions that are reduced as
a result of the project. They also receive the carbon payments from the CDCF
and transfer the money to the individual project owners (“Moldova Biomass
Heating,” 2005).
The benefits from this project, of course, are not limited to simply the
environmental impacts that occur by providing a renewable alternative to the
conventional coal-burning boilers that create massive air pollution. In
addition, this project contributes to sustainable development that has
reverberating economic and social effects, such as making hot water available
and affordable in these public buildings and leading to an overall decrease in
the cost of heat unit production. These cost savings can allow these schools
and orphanages to focus their funding on their most precious resource:
children’s education.
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4e. The Inputs and the Outputs and Efficiency

Anaerobic digesters typically can accept any biodegradable material.
This can include waste paper, grass clippings, leftover food, and sewage waste
just to name a few. In addition, many facilities have co-digestion capabilities
that can accommodate two or more types of feedstock that can not only
process animal waste generated by livestock but also grass or corn that may be
used as feedstock, for example.
However, if biogas production is the aim, the “level of putrescibility is
the key factor in its successful application” and the more putrescible the
material the higher the yield of gas (“Anaerobic Digestion Feedstock,” para.
2). A material is determined to be putrescible if it has high moisture content
and a sufficient ratio of carbon to nitrogen to allow the anaerobic bacteria to
convert it biologically and examples can include typical food and kitchen
waste. Specially-grown energy crops such as silage can also be used as an
input for dedicated biogas production.
As a result, the efficiencies and biogas yields of these inputs can vary
widely and many studies have been conducted to attempt to calculate these
yields. While some anaerobic digesters are able to achieve higher yield
outputs than others, the following chart illustrates the average yields of
various inputs.
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Table 1: Biogas Potential of Various Inputs

Raw Material

Biogas Yield (m³/ dry tonne of raw
material)

Cow Manure

60

Pig Manure

65

Grain

500-560

Silage, plant tops, grass algae

400

Fruit and Sugar Beet Pulp

50-70

Chicken Dung

130

Fat

1300

As noted, these yields are measured as the number of cubic meters of
biogas produced per dry ton of raw material. While each cubic meter of
biogas contains the equivalent of 6 kWh of calorific energy, the conversion of
biogas to electricity is a very inefficient process. Therefore, only about 2
kWh of useable electricity is generated from 1 cubic meter of biogas (“Biogas
FAQ,” 2011).
However, as mentioned previously, there is another potentially
valuable output in the form of a digestate that consists of all the indigestible
materials and dead microorganisms. The volume of this digestate as an output
will be approximately 90-95% of the volume of the input that was fed into the
digester. Therefore, approximately 1,984 – 2,095 kg of digestate is produced
from every dry tonne of raw material (“What is Digestate,” 2011) This
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digestate can be used as fertilizer at the farm where it was produced to
increase crop yields and complete the neutral carbon cycle.

5. The Economics of It All

5a. Input Selection

As mentioned in section 4, digesters can be categorized as either wet
or dry systems that are “fed” with inputs either continuously or loaded in
batches. The retention rate is an important consideration, as it indicates how
often the system will require labor and maintenance to replace the input.
A number of different factors should be considered when selecting the
optimal input for an anaerobic digestion project. First, the cost of the input
must be low enough to ensure the borrower can afford or produce it. In
addition, it must generate a product that is valued higher than the opportunity
costs of human consumption of the product. Second, the input must be easily
obtainable for the region in which the digesters are being built and the input
should not be subject to dramatic seasonal changes in production. Third, the
calculated biogas yield of the input should be considered to ensure that it is an
efficient input.
For this thesis, corn silage was decided upon for its high biogas yield
and relatively low cost. Corn silage is defined as a fermented, high-moisture
fodder that can be fed to livestock as it is high in energy and digestibility.
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Corn is also one of the primary crops of production in Ukraine, the region in
which we are studying. Those qualities, paired with the fact that silage is
relatively inexpensive when compared with other crop alternatives, make the
feedstock exceptional for anaerobic digestion. This input has an approximate
retention rate of 10 days, indicating that each batch will remain in the plant for
that duration of time and then will have to be removed and replaced (Steffen,
1998).

5b. Construction of the Anaerobic Digester

As mentioned in section 2, the average farmer has an annual natural
gas demand of approximately 4,200 cubic meters. From this natural gas
demand, we can derive the size of the anaerobic digester necessary to annually
produce that amount of biogas.
First, we must divide the total amount of biogas produced per year by
the number of batches per year in order to calculate the biogas produced per
batch. Because corn silage has a retention time of 10 days, we can assume
that there will be 36 batches per year. Therefore, when we divide 4,200 cubic
meters by 36 batches, we are left with biogas production per batch of 116.67
cubic meters.
Muller and Huttner (2005) have measured corn silage to have a biogas
yield of 400 cubic meters per metric ton of raw material. As a result, we can
divide the biogas production per batch by the yield constant in order to
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calculate the amount of corn silage required per batch. When we divide batch
production of 116.67 cubic meters of biogas by the biogas yield of 400 cubic
meters, the amount of silage required is found to be .29 metric tons.
Now that we have calculated the mass of the input that is necessary per
batch, we can use that mass to calculate the size of the anaerobic digester.
Kossman (1996) states that the size of the digester should be, on average, 120fold the quantity of silage put in daily in order to account for the production
and expansion of the biogas. With a retention rate of 10 days, we can
calculate the daily silage input by dividing the batch size (.29 metric tons) by
the number of days required for the retention rate (10), which is found to
be .029 metric tons, or 29 kilograms. When we multiply this by Kossman’s
constant of 120, we have found the mass of the digester to be 3480 kg.
However, anaerobic digesters are measured in terms of volume, not
mass, and therefore in order to calculate the volume of the digester we must
first calculate the density of the input (corn silage) that will be placed into this
digester.
Dairy One Cooperative has found the density of wet corn silage to be
43 lbs/cubic foot and the density of dry corn silage to be 14.5 lbs/cubic foot
(“Master Forage,” 2011). Because the silage that will be placed into the
digester is 35% dry matter and 65% wet matter, the calculation is (.65)(43) +
(.35)(14.5) = 33.025 lbs/cubic foot. Converting the number into metric units,
the density of the silage is found to be 15 kg/.028316 cubic meters. When
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converted into the density per cubic meter, the density is found to be
529.74kg/cubic meter.
Therefore, we can calculate the approximate volume (V) of the
digester by using the density formula and dividing the mass (M) of the
digester by the density (D) of the corn silage.
The density (D) formula:

can be re-written as:

substituting in variables:

While the volume of the actual digester is calculated to be 6.6 cubic
meters, the volume of the dome that accompanies the digester must also be
added to the total volume of the biogas plant, and that is achieved by adding ¼
of the volume of the digester. As a result, the theoretical volume of the
digester is 8.25 cubic meters.
However, actual volume of the digester should be 10% greater than the
theoretical volume in order to account for gas expansion, and therefore we can
calculate the actual volume of the digester to be rounded to 9 cubic meters for
simplicity.
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The Chinese fixed dome plant structure (see Figure 4) will be used as
the design model for implementation. Nearly 7 million of these dome plants
have been implemented throughout China for nearly 75 years and use the
seasonal crop wastes from small, rural farms as the primary input. Dome
plants in particular have the advantage of being cheap to build and have no
moving parts or metal parts that can rust. Also, they are constructed
underground which saves space, protects the digester from corrosion, and
makes them less sensitive to seasonal temperature change. As a result, the
fixed dome plant is well-regarded for its low maintenance costs. These dome
plants also have low fixed installation costs, with costs ranging around $70
per cubic meter of digester capacity (Kossman, 1996). Therefore, the
installation costs of materials would be approximately $630 for our 9 cubic
meter model. These costs include the construction of the gasholder,
digester/slurry storage container, gas appliances/piping, stable modification,
and general engineering involved with the project (Werner, 1989). However,
dome plants have some disadvantages: they often leak some gas, experience
variant
pressure
inside the
digester, and
must be
supervised by
experienced
Figure 4: Chinese Fixed Dome Plant Diagram

39

technicians (Wargert, 2009).
In addition to the cost of materials, Wargert (2009) estimates that an
average of 9 man hours per cubic meter of digester capacity must be used to
construct the plant. For the purposes of this thesis, we will assume an hourly
wage of $5 per hour which is substantially higher than the average hourly
wage in Ukraine, but the project will be awarded as a limited contract and
therefore would command a higher wage. Therefore, total labor costs of
installation (81 hours multiplied by $5) will total $405. When added to the
cost of materials, the total installation costs will amount to approximately
$1035.

5c. Maintaining the Digester

In addition to the fixed costs of installation of the biogas plant, there
are also a number of operating costs that result from the maintenance and
operation of the plant. Annual maintenance costs (such as materials for
repairs) have been estimated at approximately 3% of the digester system
turnkey cost, equating to annual costs of approximately $31.05 (Werner,
1989).
As a result, an additional variable cost related to operation will result
from the pumping, repairs, cleaning, and monitoring of the plant. Iowa State
University has estimated the annual labor required for the operation of the
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digestion system to be approximately 44.34 man hours, amounting to annual
labor costs of $221.70 (Ernst & Rodecker, 1999).

5d. Corn Silage as a Cost Factor

Low-cost corn silage can be made from every part of the corn plant,
including the stalk, by placing large amounts of the silage into heaps and then
rolling over the heap with a tractor or other large piece of machinery to push
out the air. The heap is then covered in a plastic cover held down by tires or
other heavy objects. This high-moisture feedstock is then fed into the digester
once every 10 days.
At the present time, there is no standard practice for establishing a
valuation method for corn silage because of its very nature of not being easily
transportable and the fact that it is often regarded as “waste” because it is not
fit for human consumption. Therefore, there is no market price of corn silage.
The relevant cost of the input is in fact the opportunity cost of what the silage
could otherwise be used for. However, Purdue University has taken a very
methodical concept at attempting to value corn silage that I have utilized for
my thesis (Hendrix, 2002).
The concept uses a number of equations and seeks to isolate the
amount of dry grain that is present in a quantity of the semi-liquid corn silage.
Once the quantity of this grain is found in pounds, it must then be converted
into pounds of no. 2 corn (a label which denotes the standard corn product on
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the world market), which is achieved by dividing the number of pounds of
grain by a factor. This quantity of no. 2 corn (in pounds) must then be
converted into bushels (as the world market prices grain by the bushel). It is
now possible to value the corn silage by multiplying the number of bushels of
no. 2 corn by the market bushel no. 2 corn price for Ukraine.
“First, the method assumes that the dry matter of whole plant corn
silage contains 50% grain. We’ll assume that moisture content of the silage
has been checked and found to be 65%. Therefore, dry matter content is
35%” (Hendrix, para. 5). To determine the amount of dry matter per tonne,
we simply determine 35% of 2204 lbs, which equates to 771.4 lbs. Because
only 50% of that dry matter is grain, we must only compute the price for half
of that dry matter, which is 385.7 lbs. We then divide by a factor of .845 in
order to convert our grain into no. 2 corn, which is equal to 456.5 lbs of no. 2
corn. In order to find the number of bushels, we must divide our total by 56
lbs, because there are 56 lbs of no. 2 corn in a bushel. We are then left with
8.15 bushels. According to a recent article in Agro Perspectiva (2011), the
current market price of one bushel of Ukrainian no. 2 corn is $5.92
(“Ukrainian Grain Market,” 2011). As a result, this leaves us with an
estimation of $48.25 per tonne of corn silage. However, we must also
consider the cost of the fertilizer, harvesting, and storing of silage. Purdue
University has proposed a value of $1.00 per 100 lb. of silage dry matter per
metric ton (in this case 771 lbs), resulting in an additional cost of $7.71.
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Therefore, our final estimation for the cost of corn silage per metric ton is
$55.96.
If we then multiply the batch size (.29 metric tons) by the
aforementioned price of corn silage per metric ton ($55.96) we find that our
input cost per batch will be $16.12. Because corn silage has a retention rate of
10 days, there will be approximately 36 batches each year amounting to a total
annual cost for inputs of $580.19.
If we combine the annual costs for inputs ($580.19) with the annual
costs for operation ($221.07) and maintenance ($31.05), we are left with total
annual costs of approximately $832.94.

5e. Revenues

There are two byproducts of anaerobic digestion, one of which has real,
significant value associated with it and the second of which has a usable value
to the farmers themselves but little value in the open market. The first
byproduct, a biogas that is 80% methane can be burned on-site for heat or
cooking purposes, but in order to value the byproduct as a natural gas
equivalent the amount of biogas must be multiplied by .80 in order to
determine the amount of pure methane. This methane has a fluctuating value
that is influenced by the price of oil and whose price has risen sharply in
recent years. Secondly, the undigested anaerobic waste that is produced
during the process can serve as an organic alternative for fertilizer on the
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producer’s land, but is not easily transportable and cannot easily be sold. The
opportunity costs of being able to reduce the amount of fertilizer purchased by
the farmer could also be calculated as a cost savings to the user. The most
important use of this fertilizer, though, would be ensuring that it is used to
produce more corn at the farm it was created to complete the carbon neutrality
of the system.
In addition, because of the nature of anaerobic digestion as a means of
reducing greenhouse gases, these digesters will also generate renewable
energy credits, which can be sold on an international market and will be
discussed in further detail in section 7.
Using the batch size calculated from the previous section, we can
determine the amount of biogas produced from one batch by multiplying the
batch size (.29 metric tons) by the biogas yield (400 cubic meters), which
equates to 115 cubic meters of biogas production per batch. The biogas that is
produced is only 80% methane and 20% carbon dioxide and other undesirable
compounds. The amount of biogas that is produced annually can be
determined by multiplying the production per batch (115 cubic meters) by the
number of batches (36), which equals 4147.2 cubic meters. However, in order
to calculate the revenues using the price of natural gas (which is 100%
methane) we must then multiply the 115 cubic meters by .8 in order to
determine the total cubic meters of methane produced per batch. Doing so,
we find that 92.2 cubic meters of methane are produced.

44

In order to find the annual biogas production we must multiply the
methane produced per batch (92.2 cubic meters) by the number of batches
(36), which equates to 3317.8 cubic meters per year.
The price of imported natural gas for Ukraine has increased
significantly within the past few years, and the year 2011 is no exception.
Naftogaz, the state-owned Ukrainian gas company, recently announced a
6.1% increase in price for the second quarter of 2011 to a price of $280 per
thousand cubic meters (“Price of Imported,” 2011). Therefore, the total
annual revenue generated from biogas production can be calculated by
multiplying the annual biomethane output (3.3 thousand cubic meters per year)
by the price of natural gas ($280 per thousand cubic meters) which totals
$928.97 per year.

5f. Profits

The traditional, simple definition of profit is explained as revenues
minus total costs. As a result, in order to calculate profit we must use the
aforementioned revenues generated from the methane and subtract from it the
annual costs of maintenance, operation, and input. Doing so, we can calculate
the annual profits for three digester sizes (see Table 2). These profit
calculations do not take into consideration the cost of installation, instead
illustrating annual profits for each year after year 1.

45

Table 2: Annual Profits to Borrowers
Size of Digester
Total Annual Value of Methane
Output

7 m3

9m3

11m3

$722.53

$928.97

$1,135.41

Total Annual Costs of Operation
Total Annual Profit

$687.66
$34.87

$832.94
$96.03

$953.93
$181.49

5g. Net Present Values

While profits measure the amount of money that the project will
generate each year, it does not take into account the discounted value of
money over the lifespan of the project and also does not take into account the
initial installation costs (IC) that the project must recover in order to be a
viable project and have a positive value over the life of the project. It takes
into account revenue (R), variable costs (VC), the discount rate (D), and the
lifespan of the project in years (n).

The net present value (NPV) formula can be written as such:

While we have previously calculated installation costs, revenue, and
variable costs, there are other variables that have not yet been quantified,
namely lifespan of the project and the discount rate. Puxin is a popular
Chinese company that produces a small scale biogas plant that states that the
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lifespan of a small-scale biogas plant is 30 years (“30 years lifespan,” 2011).
In addition, a discount rate of 5% was used for this analysis.
Substituting in the values that I have determined for a 9 cubic meter
biogas plant project, we find the net present value to be:

In Figure 5, we evaluate how the size of the digester influences the
NPV and we see that NPV is positive when digester is larger than 8 cubic
meters.

Net Present Value of Anaerobic Digesters by
Digester Size (m3)
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Figure 5: Net Present Value of Anaerobic Digesters
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6. Implementation of MFI in Ukraine under Proposed Plan

This section seeks to apply the aforementioned concepts of
microfinance and small-scale biogas plants into the creation of a functioning
microfinance institution that could be implemented and succeed in the country
of Ukraine. This institution will be called Zapravky May butnye Ukraïni
(ZMU), which is Ukrainian for “Fueling Ukraine’s Future.” The name of this
institution has a two-pronged meaning, as it not only refers to the future
production of the actual fuel in the form of biogas, but can also be interpreted
as an institution that is investing in technology and people that will become a
larger part of Ukraine’s portfolio in the future.
Throughout the section, I will reintroduce unique elements of
Ukraine’s political and geographic climate that would necessitate the
alteration of traditional techniques in both of these concepts. At the end of the
section, I will describe the operation of the institution and the borrowing
process. In addition, I will conduct a 20-year financial analysis for the
borrowers for the institution itself.

6a. The Target Population

As described in section 2, the natural gas demand of rural households,
and especially farmers, is considerably higher than their urban counterparts.
In fact, assuming that farm operations require 1.5 times as much natural gas as
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an average rural household, with a natural gas price of $280 per thousand
cubic meters, the annual farmer spends an incredible 39% of their annual
income on heating costs alone!
These individual farms, with an average land size of 60 ha (148 acres),
with existing infrastructure for the production of corn silage (as corn is one of
the most-produced crops in the country and is used as a feedstock), and having
an exceptionally high heating burden makes this group the optimal target
population for an institution such as this.
The requirements for access to loans from this institution would
initially be geographic and income-based. All borrowers must be located
within 150 miles of a branch to ensure proximity and must have an income of
at least $2,000 a year.

6b. The Framework and Regulation of a Microfinance Institution in Ukraine

Currently, there are only two functioning microfinance institutions in
Ukraine: ProCredit Bank Ukraine and Nadia Ukrainy. It is difficult because
there are very few “best practices” that have been designed specifically for
Ukrainian institutions. However, the two institutions alone have a total of
nearly 28,000 borrowers with total assets of $349 million and provide an
exciting outlook and opportunity for microfinance in Ukraine (“Microfinance
in Ukraine,” 2011).
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ProCredit Bank Ukraine, the larger of the two institutions, is a
development-oriented full-service bank. While it extends millions of dollars
in loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, it generally appeals to larger
businesses and the average loan size is over $10,000, well above what this
institution would be targeting.
Nadia Ukrainy, the smaller of the two institutions, and the structure
that this microfinance institution will be modeled after, is a non-banking
financial institution that is a branch of the larger HOPE International network
which works in 14 different countries. Extending non-collateralized loans for
microenterprises, agriculture, and housing, Nadia Ukrainy prides itself on the
transparency of its interest charges, fees, and penalties (“Nadia Ukrainy,”
2011). This particular commitment to client protection is necessary in a
country such as Ukraine, where corruption especially in the financial sector
has cast a negative light on the trustworthiness of such institutions. This
institution’s average size loan extended to borrowers is only $620 and has
total assets of $2.6 million (“Microfinance in Ukraine,” 2011).
These non-banking financial institutions (NBFI) provide banking
functions without meeting the legal definition of a bank and therefore cannot
take customer’s deposits. However, they can provide loans and credit
facilities from other sources of funding, such as venture capitalists. NBFIs in
Ukraine also have low minimum capital requirements of $440,000, which is
considerably lower than the world average of $7.3 million (Noel, 2006). In the
case of Nadia Ukrainy, the NBFI works with a number of different partners
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like the Polish-based Microfinance Centre for network affiliation and with
Kiva as the source of external private-citizen funding.
Prior to 2003, there were no regulatory agencies in Ukraine to oversee
operations of these
NBFIs and as a
result many were
established and
began to engage in
money

Figure 6: Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Highlighted on Map of Ukraine

misappropriation activities. Since this time, the State Commission for
Regulation of Financial Services Markets of Ukraine has adopted a legal
framework for the regulation of these institutions that has discouraged many
of these inappropriate institutions from pursuing business in Ukraine,
increasing the opportunity to gain market share in the country.

6c. Operation and Structure of the Microfinance Institution

One of the principles of microfinance is the proximity of the branches
to the people who are being served. This close proximity not only ensures
that loan agents can keep a close watch on those who are receiving these loans,
but more importantly it helps to establish a positive public relations image of
immersing the institution into the community. Employing local citizens also
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establishes a firm trust with the surrounding community. This trust is
imperative to ensuring the success of the organization.
Because the target population of this microfinance institution is rural
farmers, it is important to situate the founding branch in an area of Ukraine
that would not only be conducive to farming, but also have a large rural
population. After extensive research, the Dnipropetrovsk oblast (see Figure 6)
was selected as the location for the pilot program of this institution because of
its location in the southeastern steppe ecological zone, which is home to
Ukraine’s most arable land and has a rural population of over 600,000 people
(Rowland, 2004). This centralized administrative office would serve as the
institution’s headquarters and would administer the institution’s first loans. A
timeline for expansion will be explained later in this section.
This administrative office would originally be staffed with one loan
officer selected from the local population, whose responsibilities would be to
appeal to rural farmers via phone and in-person presentations where the
officers would describe exactly how the institution works and the benefits of
anaerobic digestion. In addition, loan officers would conduct initial training
sessions for borrowers until other staff was hired. The loan officers would be
given a base salary and benefits with opportunities for commission-based
bonuses once borrowers that they had recruited repaid their lease in full,
providing motivation for loan officers to encourage repayment. An
engineering professional would also be hired on staff and would be
responsible for working within the established budget to contract laborers on a
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per-project basis to travel to the farms, construct the anaerobic digesters, and
also service broken digesters.
As the institution expanded (a timeline can be found at the end of this
section), additional laborers would be hired to ease in the operation of the
branch. For example, a training officer would be hired to train borrowers on
the basics of how their loan works, how the institution functions, and how to
operate and maintain their digester. This training officer would also initially
serve as the human resources representative as expansion necessitated hiring
of new personnel. One branch manager would also be hired to oversee the
operations of the branch and ensure that all responsibilities were being
completed. One bookkeeper, whose sole responsibility would be to track and
report the number and amount of loans that were disbursed, would be hired as
well.

6d. Loan Structure

When the institution is first created, only one loan product will be
offered: a one-time lease of an anaerobic digester completely installed by the
institution, with a value of $1035. The lease would include a servicing charge
of $100 that would help to cover the costs of implementing the loan. As a
result, the lease’s total value would be $1135. This amount, which is
approximately 53% of Ukraine’s gross national income per capita, can be
serviced easily and optimally by traditional microfinancing.
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As the institution begins to expand and increases the number of
borrowers, other loan products will be introduced. Seasonal loans are often
required by farmers in order to purchase seeds and equipment necessary to
grow crops. The need arises because of a mismatch of when they need money
(in early spring when they plant the crops) and when they have money (in the
fall after they have harvested and sold crops).
While microfinance is built on the foundation that a loan term should
be kept short and repayment should be often, it is also important to ensure that
the borrower has the ability and capacity to repay the loan within the defined
term limit. As a result, borrowers will repay their loans monthly over the
course of five years to encourage consistent savings and to ensure that the
amount due for repayment is small and never burdensome.
Before we can calculate annual payments (A), we must first calculate
the present value of the lease (

), where r equals 5%.

This annual lease repayment of $262.12 (or $21.84 monthly) would be
a cost to the farmer for the first five years of having the digester.
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In addition, the farmer would also be responsible for the cost of
purchasing or manufacturing the corn silage that will be used as an input, with
an annual cost of $580.19 each year over the entire lifetime of the digester.
Also, operation and maintenance would be the responsibility of the borrower,
estimated in section 5 at an annual cost of $31.05. Finally, we assume for the
purpose of this thesis that the rural farmer would be willing and able to
complete the annual labor (44 hours) required to feed inputs into the digester
and periodically clean the structure.
During this time, the effective cost of fuel decreases from $280 per
thousand cubic meters (39% of average farmers’ income) to $140 per
thousand cubic meters (19.5% of their income) as biogas replaces their
imported natural gas. When we multiply the cost savings by the natural gas
usage of the farmer, we find that it would result in a first-year fuel cost
savings of $588 for the farmer.
Because the term of the loan is extended over a five year period, these
farmers would begin to experience positive profits of $55.61 beginning in year
1 and continuing through year 5, as the lease repayment, silage cost, and
operation and maintenance costs total $873.36 and the value of the biogas is
$928.97. When the lease has been repaid in full beginning at year 5, the
annual profits will increase to $317.73 a year for the remainder of the
digester’s lifespan, as the borrower no longer has the repayment cost so their
annual costs decrease to $611.24 and revenues remain constant at $928.97
(see Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Timeline of Profits to Borrowers

The structure of the loans that would be given to borrowers would be
based on a modified principle of solidarity lending, which was introduced in
section 3. This principle believes that in order to provide non-collateralized
loans, borrowers must organize themselves into groups of five in order to tap
into the social capital of reliability and responsibility. While true solidarity
lending will lend to the group as a whole and not to individuals, the logistics
of providing digesters obviously makes this impossible. This modified
solidarity lending practice states that in order for the second person to receive
his or her loan, the first borrower must have attended all of the training
courses necessary to receive the loan and begun the repayment process. In
addition, each loan amount for each borrower must be approved by the entire
group, ensuring that each group member is aware and involved in the process.
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In order for the second borrower to receive his or her loan, the first
borrower must have begun the repayment process and paid their first month’s
lease. If at any point an earlier borrower does not repay their loan, the entire
group will be held responsible to help repay the loan of the delinquent
borrower in order to continue the lending process.
This process continues onto the third, fourth, and fifth borrower and
the lack of repayment of even one borrower can significantly hinder the loan
process of all other borrowers in his or her group. This “solidarity” is able to
leverage social capital to serve as the collateral generally needed for access to
capital. The borrowing cycle does not end with the fifth borrower, however.
In order for the first borrower to be eligible for the aforementioned seasonal
loans and other additional loans that will be offered by the institution, the
borrowing cycle must have been successfully completed and all five
borrowers must be active in the repayment process (see Figure 8). While nonrepayment is an issue that all microfinance institutions must account for, this
institution is unique in the fact that the borrowers are not as mobile or likely to
flee with unpaid loans because the farmers own large pieces of property with
farm equipment and can easily be tracked down, preventing exploitation of the
process. In addition, the cost savings and revenue from these digesters are
reliable and certain. As a result, the repayment process will not be dependable
on the success of an uncertain entrepreneurial venture, as is the case in many
of the impoverished countries where microfinance exists.
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Figure 8: Institution's Borrower Cycle

6e. Portal for Funding

In the beginning of the institution, a heavy focus will be put on
attracting angel investors and forward-thinking venture capitalists that would
lend money to the institution (at a low or no interest rate) in order to be able to
provide the first loans to be made to borrowers. This appeal is necessary
because these non-banking financial institutions cannot accept deposits like a
traditional bank
Once the institution has matured and established itself, a working
partnership will be created with organizations that appeal to private citizens to
give up the use of their capital for a period of time (generally around 6 months)
so that the microfinance institution may use it for loans. The most popular of
58

all of these organizations is a web-based funding portal called Kiva, who
works with a number of field partners all across the world to showcase to
philanthropic-minded citizens the stories of real, impoverished entrepreneurs
in other countries that desperately need assistance. On the website, each
entrepreneur has a picture and a stated goal of how much funding he or she
needs to implement the project that they are proposing. The citizen can then
pledge a certain amount of money through the website to help this
entrepreneur achieve their goal, and the person at that time then “lends” their
money to Kiva at a 0% interest rate, who then disburses these funds to a field
partner to actually implement the loan. The field partner then collects the
repayment of this loan over the following months and then repays Kiva. The
original lender is generally repaid within 5-6 months. Therefore, the person
can then “recycle” their pledge a countless number of times and can request a
reimbursement of that pledge as long as they have been repaid their loan. For
an illustrative example of the process, see Figure 9 below. Kiva boasts a
98.65% repayment rate and therefore there is little actual risk to the lender of
losing their loan (“About Us,” 2011).
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Figure 9: Kiva Loan Cycle

Kiva works in close partnership with over 130 field partners
(microfinance institutions) around the world in order to implement these loans.
There are strict requirements for becoming a field partner, including having an
active portfolio of at least 1,000 borrowers, having a history of at least 2-3
years of lending, be registered as a legal entity in the country of origin, and
having at least 1 year of financial audits. However, the benefits include a 0%
interest debt capital, a short time period (1 week) required to pilot the program,
low administrative costs of less than 1% as a factor of capital raised, and
improved staff morale.
The process of posting borrower information onto the Kiva website
would fall onto the responsibility of the loan officers, who would take
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photographs of the farmers, translate their background stories, and upload the
images onto the website.
As seen above, this strategy of raising capital could only be
implemented as the microfinance institution matured and achieved the goals
required to become a Kiva field partner. Before these goals were reached, the
institution would seek angel investors and philanthropic contributions in order
to initially provide loans. For the purpose of this paper, we assume
philanthropic investors loan capital to the institution at a 0% interest rate.

6f. Costs of the Institution

“Microfinance is a high touch, high cost business,” says Adrian
Gonzalez of the Microfinance Information Exchange. Operating expenses
represent 62 percent of the interest rate that is charged to borrowers and
includes a number of costs borne by the institution. These costs are a result of
the institution’s focus, as it is much more expensive to disburse (100) $1,000
loans that it is to disburse one $100,000 loan. The administrative costs of
processing the high number of applications, the physical time spent traveling
and visiting with borrowers, the costs of training materials to conduct training
seminars, and the operation of a large number of branches necessitated by the
need for being close to borrowers all contribute to this high cost of operation.
Because some of these costs (rent, salaries, training seminars that can
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accommodate hundreds of borrowers) are fixed costs, the smaller the amount
of loans and the smaller the institution, the higher the cost of doing business.
In order to eventually achieve financial self-sufficiency, the
microfinance institution must pass these costs onto the borrowers in the form
of fees on their loans. Critics complain that many institutions charge fees that
are as high, if not higher, than the poor person’s alternative: moneylenders.
However, this institution would be able to keep operating costs low because
the loan amount is considerably high and specialization of job duties within
the institution would ensure efficiency. In addition, by at first offering only
one product to borrowers, it would reduce the variable costs of being trained
and servicing many different products.
Obviously the largest cost to the microfinance institution is the fact
that there is a mismatch of cash flows, as they are required to pay for the cost
of installing the digester in a lump sum; however they don’t fully recover
those costs from the farmers until 5 years later. That is why it is so important
to first find investors that would be willing to lend the use of their capital
during this time.
In addition, like all businesses, microfinance institutions have normal
operation costs that are fixed. For instance, the wages of salaried employees
would cost the institution approximately $280 per month per employee hired.
The cost of renting space in an office building in the Dnipropetrovsk region
will cost the institution approximately $500 per month. Utilities such as water,
heat, phone service, and internet will cost the institution a further $100 per
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month. Original investments in office equipment like computers and fax
machines will result in a cost of approximately $1000 per month for the first
year. After the first year, the cost will drop to $300 per month for the
remaining years, as the costs shift to less expensive training materials and
other accessory expenses. Finally, the World Bank completed a study in June
2010 that found that the filing expenses of creating a business in Ukraine
(opening a bank account, registration fees, and preparing a company seal)
totaled a one-time fee of $136 that would be paid in the first year (“Starting a
Business,” 2010).

6g. Expansion Timeline

The institution aims to have consistent growth as it expands in new
loans, total loans outstanding, and total operating branches to distribute these
loans. In year one, the institution’s first branch office will be established and
will begin to disburse loans with a staff of two employees, one loan officer to
establish a client base and one engineer to coordinate the construction of the
digesters. In the first years, exponential growth of new loans would be
expected and the number of staff would increase exponentially as well. The
exponential growth of the institution would also translate into high costs that
would not be able to be covered by the small amounts of revenue being
generated from the repayment of the loans. As a result, the institution would
rely on external financing and not be financially self-sustainable until year 6.
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The institution would achieve a number of milestones during this time,
distributing its 100th loan approximately 1 year after it gave out its first. In
addition, the institution would qualify to become a Kiva partner
approximately 3 years after its creation when it distributes its 1000th loan. At
that point, it would generate significant interest and publicity from national
media outlets, as well as begin receiving capital through Kiva, that would
cause an increase in the number of new loans it disbursed during the third year.
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Figure 10: Timeline of Microfinance Institution Growth

In the fifth year after its creation, the institution would open a second
branch elsewhere in Ukraine (see Figure 10 for the full timeline) in order to
accommodate more rural farmers that would increase the institution’s cost of
labor, rent, utilities, and office equipment, but would undoubtedly provide a
much larger target population for the institution.
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In year 6, the institution would have matured into a stable organization
that would see continued, steady growth. In addition, the number of
outstanding loans (those which are being repaid to the institution) would also
be high enough at this point to allow the institution to become financially selfsustainable and post a modest profit in that year of approximately $400,000.
The microfinance institution would actually experience for the first time a
decrease in the number of new loans disbursed that year, as saturation of the
target population begins to occur. This decrease will continue until a new
branch is constructed, which would occur once every four years under the
linear growth model. At that point, the number of new loans would become
cyclical, decreasing until a new branch was opened at which point the number
would begin to increase again, and so on. The number of new staff hired by
the institution would increase by 2 each year, except in those years where a
new branch was opened, when the number of new staff would increase by 3.
As a result of this linear growth, at year 10 the number of new loans
issued each year would begin to level out to approximately 1,800 per year (see
Figure 11). Beginning in year 13, the total numbers of loans outstanding at
any point in time would be approximately 8,900 (see Figure 12) and annual
profits of the institution would remain constant at approximately $1.1 million.
The first generation of the digesters built would continue until year 30, at
which point those digesters that were built in the first year would begin to be
phased out. At this point in year 30, nearly 51,000 digesters would have been
built and in operation (see Figure 13 for an illustration of this digester growth).
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Finally, see Appendix B for a full analysis of costs and revenues of this
institution.
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Figure 13: Projected Digester Construction Growth

7. Results

7a. The Environmental Benefits to This Institution

As mentioned in section 3, anaerobic digesters are carbon neutral and
thus their greenhouse gas reduction comes as a result of offsetting the
emissions that would have been produced had the farm instead used a fossil
fuel-based natural gas. In order to calculate these offset emissions, we must
determine the amount of greenhouse gases that would have been released into
the atmosphere from burning 3,317 cubic meters of natural gas annually (the
amount of methane produced per digester from section 5).

67

First, we must calculate the heat content of the methane that is
produced. A table located on the website The Engineering Tool Box has
found the net heating value of methane to be 910 British thermal units
(Btu)/ft3. In order to convert this value into cubic meters, we must multiply
the number by a factor of 35.315. As a result, we find that the heat content
per cubic meter is (910)(35.315) = 32,317 Btu/m3. When we multiply this
number by the amount of cubic meters of methane produced annually (3,317)
we find that annual heat content of each digester is approximately 106.597
million Btu.
Second, we must calculate the amount of CO2 that is emitted from the
generation of this amount of heat. The Department of Energy has determine
that 117.080 lbs of CO2 is produced per million Btu from methane. In order
to convert this number into the metric system, we must first multiply 117.080
lb by .454 kg/lb to find that 53.2 kg of CO2 is produced per million Btu.
Finally, we must multiply the amount of Btu generated from each
digester by its CO2 production constant. Doing so, we find that (106.597
million Btu)(53.2e kg/million Btu) = 5671 kg. Converting this into metric
tons, we find that each anaerobic digester offsets 5.67 metric tons of CO2
annually.
Aggregating all of the digesters, we can easily calculate the total
amount of CO2 that is offset annually from constructing these digesters. In
year 1, total carbon offsets will amount to 567 metric tons and will continue to
grow annually. For example, in year 30 when 51,000 digesters are in
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operation there will be a carbon offset of over 260,000 metric tons annually
(see Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Projected Carbon Dioxide Offset Growth

7b. Carbon Trading: The Financial Benefits to Anaerobic Digestion

The UNFCCC has succeeded in transforming international
environmental policy in the last decade in such a way that it has created an
enormous number of financial incentives to implementing such renewable
energy projects like anaerobic digestion. The foundation of the Kyoto
Protocol has committed signatory countries to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions by a particular percentage in relation to a benchmark year that has
been selected. Although this commitment encourages countries to begin the
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construction of renewable energy projects within their borders, the protocol
also allows for countries to engage in international transactions in order to
gain other emission reductions, operating on the principle that reductions in
carbon emissions anywhere have the same impact on our shared atmosphere.
The most exciting of these new incentives involves the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), which was created under Article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol, which created a carbon trading market where developed
countries could purchase Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from
underdeveloped countries. These CERs are, in effect, certificates stating that
projects conducted in these underdeveloped countries were proven to have
reduced exactly 1 tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (“Emission Reductions
Unit,” 2011).
These CERs are traded on the European Climate Exchange (ECX),
which functions much like a stock market where buyers (in this case
companies and private individuals) purchase enough CERs from sellers
(brokers) in order to come into compliance with their respective goals or
mandates for emissions reductions.
While CERs are generated from projects that originate in
underdeveloped countries, there are also Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)
that are generated from projects implemented in developed countries under the
Joint Implementation mechanism, where developed nations can purchase
emissions reductions from other developed nations. Ukraine is considered a
developed nation under the Kyoto Protocol and therefore any offsets
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originating from projects in this country would generate ERUs. These ERUs
have just recently begun to be traded on the ECX and Ukraine has emerged as
the largest issuance of these certificates to date.
There is some precedent established for JI projects that in fact generate
these ERUs for sale. The Palhalma Biogas Plant, a digester located at a
meatpacking plant in Hungary, was recently brought online in 2008 and
generates over 37,000 ERUs a year that it then sells on the ERU market
(“Palhalma Biogas Plant,” 2011).
The most recent data from the European Climate Exchange values
June 2011 future contracts of ERUs at $18.74/metric ton of carbon emission
reduction.
As a result, once the institution has matured there is real and
significant opportunity for this institution to couple together the offsets
achieved from its thousands of anaerobic digesters and to sell these ERUs on
the ECX. In year 30, the annual value of these ERUs could reach nearly $5.5
million (see Figure 15).
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Figure 15: Projected Annual Value of ERUs

7c. The Effects on Natural Gas Imports from this Institution

Finally, it is important to calculate the impact that this institution is
having on the amount of natural gas that is imported to Ukraine each year. As
mentioned, approximately 75% of Ukraine’s natural gas usage (60 billion
cubic meters) is imported from Russia and Turkmenistan each year.
As found in section 5, each anaerobic digester produces 3,300 cubic
meters of methane per year. In order to calculate the total amount of natural
gas produced each year, we simply multiply 3,300 by the number of digesters.
As a result, we find that while in year 1 there is a total annual natural gas
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production of only 330,000 cubic meters, by year 30 the total annual
production has grown to 168.3 million cubic meters. While this number
represents only .3% of Ukraine’s annual natural gas imports, it would amount
to a very significant increase in the amount of renewable energy as a portion
of the country's energy production (see Figure 16).

Annual Total Methane Production From
Digesters

Methane Production (m3)

120000000

100000000

80000000

60000000

40000000

20000000

0
0

5

10

15

20

Year
Figure 16: Projected Methane Production from Digesters

7d. Summary

In conclusion, the promise and potential for renewable energy is not
simply welcomed, it is absolutely imperative in order for Ukraine to prevent a
natural gas conflict that could have repercussions for decades to come. While
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the costs of natural gas are only increasing, the costs of renewable
technologies are decreasing substantially due to producers achieving
economies of scale and new research increasing efficiency. Anaerobic
digestion proves particularly promising as it is a low-cost, highly efficient
process that could be implemented in Ukraine. Rather than force the burden
of a large lump sum payment on poor, rural farmers, it has been shown that it
is financially feasible to create a microfinance institution that would lease
these digesters and allow farmers to repay loans over a 5-year time period.
The environmental, financial, and societal impacts that this project could have
would reverberate across the world. It would fuel Ukraine’s future while
simultaneously changing the lives of thousands of people all across this
eastern European country.
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APPENDIX A
9

Size of Digester
COSTS
Initial Cost of Construction
Installation Cost (USD)/ m3
Average Cost of Installation
Man Hours for Construction (9 hours/ m3)
Total Labor Cost (@ $5/ hour)
Total Installation Cost

70
630
81
405
1035

Operation and Maintenance Costs
Annual O&M costs (3% of digester
system turnkey cost)
Labor (44.34 hours annually * $5/ hr)
Annual Maintenance and Labor Costs

31.05
221.7
252.75

Input Costs
Market Price of Corn Silage (per metric
ton)
Quantity of Silage per Batch (metric
tons)
Total Cost of Silage per Batch
Length of Retention Time (days)
Batches per Year
Annual Silage Cost
Annual Maintenance and Labor Costs
(from above)
Total Annual Costs of Operation

$55.96
0.288
$16.12
10
36
$580.19
$252.75
$832.94

REVENUES
Quantity of Silage per Batch (metric
tons)
0.288
Biogas Yield of Silage (m3 per metric ton of silage)
400
Biogas Production per Batch (m3)
115.2
Biogas Production per Year (m3)
4147.2
Amount of Methane Produced per m3
Biogas (%)
80%
Amount of Methane Produced Per Batch
92.16
Number of Batches Per Year
36
Methane Production per Year (m3)
3317.76
Price of Natural Gas (100% Methane)
per 1000 m3 in Q2 2011 (in USD)
$
280
Total Annual Value of Methane Output
$928.97
TOTALPROFIT

$96.03
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Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

100
100
2,184
26,208

500
600
13,104
157,248

1,200
1,800
39,312
471,744

8,625

43,125

1
2
560
500
100

1,000
11
10,796

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Year 7

Year 8

Year 9

Year 10

Year 15

Year 20

Year 25

Year 30

2,000
3,800
82,992
995,904

2,200
6,000
131,040
1,572,480

2,400
8,300
181,272
2,175,264

2,000
9,800
214,032
2,568,384

1,800
10,400
227,136
2,725,632

1,500
9,900
216,216
2,594,592

1,800
9,500
207,480
2,489,760

2,000
9,100
198,744
3,239,964

1,800
8,900
194,376
3,168,756

1,500
8,600
187,824
3,061,944

1,800
8,900
194,376
3,168,756

103,500

172,500

189,750

207,000

172,500

155,250

129,375

155,250

172,500

155,250

129,375

155,250

1
5
1,400
500
100

1
8
2,240
500
100

1
10
2,800
500
100

2
15
4,200
1,000
200

2
17
4,760
1,000
200

2
19
5,320
1,000
200

2
21
5,880
1,000
200

3
24
6,720
1,500
300

3
26
7,280
1,500
300

4
37
10,360
2,000
400

5
48
13,440
2,500
500

7
60
16,800
3,500
700

8
71
19,880
4,000
800

300
0
45,425

300
0
106,640

300
0
176,200

1,300
0
196,450

600
0
213,560

600
0
179,620

600
0
162,930

1,600
0
139,495

900
0
165,230

1,200
0
186,460

1,500
0
173,190

2,800
0
153,175

2,400
0
182,330

26,208 157,248 471,744
995,904 1,572,480 2,175,264 2,568,384
129,556 545,100 1,279,680 2,114,400 2,357,400 2,562,720 2,155,440
(103,348) (387,852) (807,936) (1,118,496) (784,920) (387,456)
412,944

2,725,632
1,955,160
770,472

2,594,592
1,673,940
920,652

2,489,760
1,982,760
507,000

3,239,964
2,237,520
1,002,444

3,168,756
2,078,280
1,090,476

3,061,944
1,838,100
1,223,844

3,168,756
2,187,960
980,796

REVENUES(MONTHLY)
New Loans
Loans Outstanding
Revenue (Monthly)
Revenue (Annual)
COSTS(MONTHLY)
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Cost of Office Equipment
& Accessories
Filing Fees
Costs (Monthly)
Revenue (Annual)
Costs (Annual)
PROFITS(Annual)

Total Number of Digesters
Amount of CO2 offset
(tonnes)
Value of ERUs

100

600

1,800

3,800

6,000

8,400

10,400

12,200

13,700

15,500

24,600

33,500

42,100

51,000

567
10,626

3,402
63,753

10,206
191,260

21,546
403,772

34,020
637,535

47,628
892,549

58,968
1,105,060

69,174
1,296,321

77,679
1,455,704

87,885
1,646,965

139,482
2,613,893

189,945
3,559,569

238,707
4,473,369

289,170
5,419,046

Natural Gas Produced (m3) 330,000 1,980,000 5,940,000 12,540,000 19,800,000 27,720,000 34,320,000 40,260,000 45,210,000 51,150,000 81,180,000 110,550,000 138,930,000 168,300,000

APPENDIX B

Installation of Digesters
Number of Operating
Branches
Staff
Cost of Labor
Cost of Rent
Cost of Utilities

SUMMARY

With rising gas prices, countries all across the world are finding
themselves in precarious and vulnerable situations. With increasing globalism
also comes increasing dependence on other countries for a variety of imports,
the most important of which being energy. The production and consumption
of natural gas and other fossil-fuel based energy products will undoubtedly
become a more and more contentious issue as global supplies decrease if
demand for these fuels remains constant or increases. Few countries have had
to face this situation as head-on as Ukraine. Relying on any country for 69%
of its natural gas supply would be particularly problematic, but when this
country is also a former hostile occupier of the country it is easy to see how
this situation has the potential for conflict that could reverberate across the
world.
This paper seeks to identify and evaluate alternative fuels that could be
implemented in Ukraine as a part of a strategic plan to reduce Ukraine’s
dependency on Russia for energy. While a number of renewable energy
technologies exist, anaerobic digestion was selected because of its versatility,
scalability, and relatively low cost of construction and operation. In addition,
these digesters can be fueled by any biodegradable material. One of the inputs
with the highest biogas potential (efficiency) is corn silage, a product used by
fermenting undesired parts of the corn stalk that is generally used for feeding
livestock. The process for creating this silage requires very simple techniques
and on many rural farms across the country this silage is already produced.
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As a result, these rural farms quickly emerged as a potential target
population for these digesters for a variety of reasons, including: ownership of
large amounts of land upon which to build these digesters and existing
production of the input. Using the rural farmer’s annual demand of 4,200
cubic meters of natural gas, I was able to derive the size of the digester
required to produce exactly that amount of biogas. The size of the digester
needed was determined to be 9 cubic meters. By calculating the value of the
biogas produced (determined to be 80% methane) and identifying the total
costs of operation, maintenance, and producing the corn silage needed as an
input, I conducted a financial analysis of the digester (not yet taking into
account the cost of construction) and showed that this particular digester size
would produce annual profits of $96.03 a year and have a positive net present
value of $442. In addition, while this paper did not assign a value to the
benefits afforded to a rural home from being completely independent from
foreign energy, it is assumed that the dependability and self-sufficiency of the
system would add value to the project.
However, as I mentioned previously, we have not yet taken into
account the cost of construction both in our calculations and in our strategy
for implementation. While these rural farmers have the optimal location for
installation of these digesters, they do not have the financial means to afford a
large lump sum payment of $1,035 required for the materials and labor
necessary to construct the digester. In addition, these rural farmers (with
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annual incomes of approximately $3,000) do not have access to the traditional
bank loans that would allow them to borrow this amount of money.
This is where the role of microfinance comes in. Microfinance has
successfully been introduced in countries all across the world and is defined as
the provisioning of credit to low-income people who would otherwise not
have access to it. Ukraine is no exception, as it is home to two microfinance
institutions (MFIs) that provide no-collateral seasonal agricultural loans and
loans for entrepreneurial ventures. This paper postulates the creation of an
MFI named “Zapravky May butnye Ukraïni” (which is Ukrainian for
“Fueling Ukraine’s Future”) that would begin offering one product in the form
of a lease for the construction of the digester. This lease amount would be
$1135 (the cost of the digester’s construction plus a $100 processing fee) that
would be repaid over the course of five years. The borrowing methodology
would be a modified version of the solidarity lending principle. In absence of
collateral, the institution would require borrowers to organize into groups of
five and leases would only be extended to the second borrower if the first
borrower had begun the repayment process and attended all required training
sessions, and so on until the fifth borrower received the digester. Once all five
borrowers had received a digester and begun the repayment process, the cycle
would return to the first borrower who would then be eligible for seasonal
agricultural loans that could assist the farmer in building their capacity.
A financial analysis was then conducted for both the borrower and the
institution to evaluate the effect that these leases would have on the financial
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means of both parties. It was found that borrowers would benefit from
producing this biogas and being able to offset completely their previous
purchase of natural gas. In the first year through the fifth year, the value of
the methane produced from the digester (80% of the biogas) equated to
$928.97 while the cost of lease repayment, corn silage, operation, and
maintenance amounted to $873.36. This left the borrower with a slim, but
positive, annual profit of $55.61 in the first five years. Once the lease had
been repaid in full, their annual profit would increase to $317.73 as their
annual costs decrease to $611.24 and their revenues remain constant at
$928.97.
In addition, ZMU would also be able to generate profit from the
operations, although not immediately due to the structure of its cash flows.
While their costs (in the form of paying for the materials and labor necessary
for the construction of the digester) would be due as a lump sum, their
revenues (in the form of borrowers’ lease repayment) would not recover those
costs until 5 years later. As a result, the institution would not become selfsustainable and post profits until year 7 of operations. At that point, the
institution would have matured and begun to level out to issue approximately
1,800 new loans per year, have an outstanding loan portfolio of 8,900 loans
being repaid, and annual profits of the institution would be approximately
$1.1 million. This paper extrapolated growth until year 30, at which point the
digesters issued in year 1 would be taken out of commission, when nearly
51,000 digesters would have been built and in operation.
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The environmental benefits that this institution could generate would
come as a result of offsetting emissions that would have otherwise been
released if these rural farms had continued burning natural gas. This is due to
the fact that anaerobic digestion is a carbon neutral system, as the corn that is
being used as an input has already removed carbon from the atmosphere. As
long as the undigested material that is removed from the digester after the
biogas has been produced is used as a fertilizer to grow more corn, the system
is carbon neutral and all emissions from the burning of the biogas are offset.
As a result, this institution would be responsible for an amount of carbon
dioxide offset equal to 567 metric tons in year 1 that will grow to over
260,000 metric tons annually in year 30.
These carbon dioxide offsets have financial benefits too. Projects that
help to offset one metric ton of carbon dioxide can be eligible for the
production of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) that can be sold on an
international market. The European Climate Exchange currently values these
ERUs at $18.74/metric ton of carbon dioxide offset. The combined offset of
digesters all across Ukraine built from this institution has the potential to
generate a significant amount of additional revenue to this institution,
approximately $5.5 million annually in year 30.
Finally, the amount of methane (natural gas) that is produced from
these digesters is an important finding of this paper, as it directly addresses the
initial problem of energy dependency. In order to determine this number, I
multiplied 3,300 cubic meters of methane (the amount of pure methane
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generated by each digester) by the total number of digesters in operation in
year 30 (51,000) and found that the natural gas production that this institution
is responsible for would be 168.3 million cubic meters in year 30.
While this paper concentrated on a particular country, the importance
and significance of this paper is in fact the implications that this institution
could have on other countries all across the world. Ukraine is absolutely not
alone in being dependent on other countries for energy. In fact, other than the
major producers of fossil fuels, there is some level of energy imports present
in every country’s economy. The advantage and uniqueness of this project
lies in the fact that its technology can operate in almost any climate and its
microfinance methodology can be transferred to nearly any low-income
country in the world. With rising oil and natural gas prices, more and more of
these renewable technologies will become financially feasible. As our
world’s supply of energy decreases and demand remains constant, or
increases, we must be prepared for identifying alternative sources of where we
obtain our energy from. For when the wells run dry, who will be left standing
out in the cold?
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